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Abstract: 
This essay has revisited the view of Chalmers Johnson that peasant nationalism was the key to 
the CCP’s rise to power in 1949. In doing so, reference has been made to other important 
factors as well in order to assess and compare their respective contributions to the party’s 
success against that of peasant nationalism. This essay argues that nationalism, induced by the 
Japanese invasion, was one of the factors that brought peasants closer to the CCP, but was 
neither the only one nor the key. There were other important factors too that directly or 
indirectly contributed to the CCP’s rise to power in 1949.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite their all-out efforts, the communists in China could not gain popular support before the 
Japanese invasion in 1937 (Johnson, C. A. 1962: 1). During the Sino-Japanese war from 1937-
1945, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) started gaining ground in China, and, at one point, 
positioned itself in the forefront of Chinese politics, overtaking the Kuomintang (KMT). After 
World War II, civil war broke out in China and the CCP won a decisive victory against the 
KMT. Following 28 years of ups and downs, it finally ascended to power under the leadership 
of Mao Zedong in October 1949. Contrarily, the KMT generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, along 
with his 2 million nationalist followers, fled to the island of Taiwan (New York Times, 1975). 
How did the CCP, once considered the underdog, manage to ascend to power in 1949? What 
factors helped them to win the civil war against the KMT?  
This essay will critically examine the merit of the argument that peasant nationalism brought 
the CCP to power in 1949. In doing so, it will initially try to examine the concept of 
nationalism in the Chinese context. Secondly, an overview of the history of the CCP will be 
presented by dividing it into three distinct periods – a) the initial years from 1921 to 1936, b) 
the years of resistance against the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945, and c) the years of 
civil war from 1946 to 1949. Thirdly, the main section of the essay will critically analyze the 
contribution of peasant nationalism towards the CCP’s rise to power in 1949. This section will 
frequently refer to other important factors as well in order to assess and compare their 
respective contributions to the party’s success against that of peasant nationalism. Finally, the 
main arguments will be summarized in order to reach a conclusion.        
2. NATIONALISM IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT:  
The concept of Chinese nationalism has been a relatively new phenomenon and had emerged 
during the period of shame and humiliation in the 19th century under colonial occupation (Zhao, 
S. 2000: 3-4). It was further ‘sparked off’ in 1895 when China was defeated by Japan (Yahuda, 
M. 2000: 26). According to Joseph R. Levenson, China had moved ‘from culturalism to 
nationalism’ as part of its transition to modernity (Levenson, J. R. 1971). The May 4th 
movement of 1919, largely participated by students and intellectuals, had been viewed by many 
as the beginning of a modern nationalist movement for China (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 21). 
Finally, Japan’s invasion in the 1930s played a major role in reinvigorating ‘China’s new 
nationalism’ (Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 312). 
In China, nationalism has been literally expressed as ‘minzu zhuyi’ which generally refers to 
various ethnic nationalities. The term minzu (nation) was first introduced in the Chinese 
‘political lexicon’ in 1899 and the concept of minzu zhuyi (nationalism) was first used in 1901 
(Yahuda, M. 2000: 27). Sun Yat-sen first used the concept in 1904 and referred, in fact, to the 
idea of Han nationalism (ibid., p. 27). However, he revised his position after the 1911 
revolution and stressed on creating a ‘national people’ (Zhao, S. 2000: 25). In a similar fashion, 
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Mao Zedong triumphantly announced on 1 October 1949 – ‘The Chinese people have stood up’ 
(Yahuda, M. 2000: 29). Here, Mao was referring to a unified Chinese nationalism – the official 
position of the CCP until today.  
3. OVERVIEW OF THE CCP’S HISTORY FROM 1921 TO 1949: 
3.1. The Initial Years from 1921 to 1936: 
In 1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in Shanghai (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 
21). Initially, the CCP’s focus was to organize the factory workers in urban China. In parallel, 
the party also established a strategic relationship with the KMT (Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, 
M. 2006, c1992: 281-282). In the early 1920s, Sun Yat-sen agreed to accept soviet aid and 
allow the communists to hold joint membership in the KMT (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 22). In 
1924, both the parties formally launched the ‘First United Front’ to fight imperialism (Tomba, 
L. 2010: 156). After the death of San Yat-sen in 1925, the alliance grew weak and in 1927, 
when the KMT launched an ‘anti-communist coup’, it fell apart (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 22). 
The CCP hitherto was still at ‘its infancy’ having a little more than 300 members in 1922 and 
around 1500 members in 1925 (Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 282). After 
being purged by the KMT in 1927, Mao adopted a completely different mass-line strategy 
targeted towards rural China and in 1928, the first ‘Red Army’ was formed (Snow, E. 1968, 
c1938: 23). The following years saw the CCP establish a few ‘small enclaves’ in rural China 
where the communists applied various ‘ideological, economic, and military’ experimentations 
(Johnson, C. A. 1962: 1). This rural strategy eventually resulted in the creation of the first 
‘Chinese Soviet Republic’ in 1931 in the mountainous areas of Hunan and Jianxi provinces 
(Tomba, L. 2010: 157). The KMT was not willing to silently witness the expansion of the CCP, 
and, therefore, tried to militarily suppress further growth of the party. Due to the KMT 
onslaught, the CCP had to launch, in 1934, a mass retreat campaign known as the ‘Long 
March’. The party lost most of its cadres, resources, and territories during this catastrophic 
event (Esherick, J. W. 1995: 59). But it helped Mao Zedong to win over his ideological rivals 
and emerge as the supreme leader of the party by 1935 (Tomba, L. 2010: 157). 
3.2. The Years of Resistance against the Japanese Invasion from 1937 to 
1945: 
Japan invaded China massively in July, 1937 (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 24). The 2nd United Front 
was formed between the KMT and the CCP, and, as part of the agreement, the Red Army was 
absorbed in the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies under Chinag Kai Shek’s command (ibid., 
p. 24). In 1938, the Japanese forces took control of north China forcing the KMT government 
to retreat to the west (ibid., p. 25). At the time, the CCP was busy organizing the peasants in 
north China behind the Japanese lines resulting in rapid expansion of communist cadres and 
military forces (Ven, H. J. 2003: 241). In fact, the 2nd United Front agreement was not very 
effective due to ‘mutual distrust’ (Franke, W, 1970: 171). As a result, infighting between the 
two parties erupted from as early as 1939. Both the KMT and the CCP forces were fighting two 
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wars simultaneously – a) against the Japanese invaders and b) against each other (Fairbank, J. 
K. and Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 316). The CCP, in the territories under its control, undertook 
various experimentations such as land reforms, mass mobilization, guerilla warfare, and so 
forth (Tomba, L. 2010: 157). The results were overwhelming. The communists gained major 
strength during the period of Japanese invasion. By 1943, the CCP achieved the marks of 
800,000 party members, 500,000 armed forces, and a liberated area with over a 100 million 
population (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 25). The numbers continued to grow, and, by 1945, reached 
to 1,200,000 party members and 910,000 armed forces (Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. 2006, 
c1992: 316). 
3.3. The Years of Civil War from 1946 to 1949:  
Upon Japan’s surrender in 1945, the KMT and the CCP were in discussion to form a coalition 
government, while concurrently preparing to engage in a civil war (Fairbank, J. K. and 
Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 328). Mao Zedong even flew to Chongqing to meet Chiang Kai 
Shek (Snow, E. 1968, c1938: 25) and agreed upon the terms of coalition (Bianco, L. 1971: 171). 
But fighting erupted between the fierce competitors to take control of the key territories. The 
communist forces tried to compel the nearby Japanese garrisons to surrender to them (Franke, 
W. 1970: 183). Around 50,000 US troops were deployed to protect Beijing and Tianjin, and 
nationalist troops were airlifted by US planes to the cities of Manchuria and north China 
(Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 329). Contrarily, the USSR held on to 
Manchuria until May 1946 waiting for the communists to take control (ibid., p. 329). The 
armaments left behind by the Japanese forces in Manchuria came to the hands of the 
communists and helped them fight the subsequent civil war (Franke, W. 1970: 187).  
Up to early 1947, the KMT forces were on a massive offensive capturing many of the territories 
from the communists and even took control of Yan’an, the iconic headquarters of the 
communists (Bianco, L. 1971: 175). In response, the CCP forces counterattacked during mid 
1947 to regain control over the lost territories (Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 
336). Amidst the communist onslaught, the KMT forces in the cities were ‘besieged and 
isolated’ and many of them were compelled to either surrender or defect to the communists 
(ibid., p. 336). By 1948, the CCP forces drove out the KMT forces from the northeast 
(Lieberthal, K. 2004, c1995: 53). Subsequently, northern China was also taken over by the 
communists in early 1949 (ibid., p. 53). The same year witnessed Chiang Kai Shek’s flight to 
Taiwan along with his followers. Ironically, the victorious Mao entered Beijing in March 1949 
with his troops riding on American-made trucks and tanks that were captured from the 
nationalists (Fairbank, J. K. and Goldman, M. 2006, c1992: 336).      
4. PEASANT NATIONALISM INFLUENCING THE CCP’S RISE TO 
POWER IN 1949: A CRITIQUE:  
According to Chalmers A. Johnson, it was the spirit of nationalism that brought the peasants 
closer to the CCP during 1937 – 1945 and even further during the civil war from 1946 – 1949 
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(Johnson, C. A. 1962: 2). However, there have been serious criticism and competing 
viewpoints in this regard (Gillian, D. G. 1964; Selden, M. 1971; Bianco, L. 1971; Esherick, J. 
W. 1995; Pepper, S. 2004; Goodman, D. S. G. 2011). Johnson’s view suffers from the problems 
of ‘overgeneralization’ and ‘monocausality’ (Goodman, D. S. G. 2011: 4; Pepper, S. 2004: 119). 
Johnson too admitted, in his conclusion, that he underplayed some of the ‘long-range factors 
that contributed to the mobilization of the Chinese people’ (Johnson, C. A. 1962: 185). Looking 
at peasant nationalism in isolation, separating it from the CCP’s agrarian reform policies, would 
be insufficient to appreciate why the CCP was more successful than the KMT in building an 
alliance with the rural peasantry (Selden, M. 1995: 19; Gillin, D. G. 1964: 288). This section 
will, therefore, simultaneously evaluate the roles of a few other important factors, admittedly 
underplayed by Johnson, in order to overcome the said problems.          
The Japanese invasion and the resulting retreat by the KMT government from northern China 
created a political and administrative vacuum in the rural areas behind the Japanese lines 
(Johnson, C. A. 1962: 2). Under the circumstances, the CCP came forward to fill this vacuum 
and formed ‘ad-hoc governments’ to govern those territories (ibid., p. 3). This gave them the 
opportunity to build a ‘trusted alliance’ with the rural peasantry that could hopefully be 
sustained, at least, up to the CCP’s rise to power in 1949. Nationalism perhaps inspired the 
peasants to initially flock to the communists in the situation of a vacuum. But how far it had 
played a role in building ‘trust’ remains a big question mark. The experience of sharing 
responsibilities in securing the village, feeding the population, providing other basic services to 
the villagers probably played a much larger role in strengthening the relationship (Bianco, L. 
1971: 190). In fact, the Chinese peasantry chose to support the CCP after comparing the 
benevolence of the communists with that of the KMT.  
Some scholars argue that the socio-economic policies of the CCP to address the ‘distress of the 
Chinese peasantry’ played a major role in building a trusted relationship between the two 
(Johnson, C. A. 1962: viii). Those policies of the party were the key contributors to the CCP’s 
success in gaining popular support from the peasants (Gillian, D. G. 1964: 281; Selden, M. 
1971: 120; Selden, M. 1995: 20-21; Esherick, J. W. 1995: 62). Lucien Bianco suggested that 
there were other factors apart from peasant nationalism that helped the CCP to mobilize the 
peasantry (Bianco, L. 1971: 187-190). The CCP reform programs related to land taxes, land 
rent, interest rates, and a participatory governance system were attractive enough for the 
peasants of China to defend the same in their own interest (White, T. and Jacoby, A. 1946: 201-
202). Chinese peasants were desperate to ensure the continuation of the ‘social and political 
advances’ that they had achieved with the party during the war of resistance against the 
Japanese and, therefore, continued to stand by the communists until  the final victory in 1949 
(Bianco, L. 1971: 187; Esherick, J. W. 1995: 68). The Red Army, which became the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) in July 1946, gained huge popular support mainly due to their good 
behavior and the socio-economic policies pursued by the communists (Gillin, D. G. 1964: 281). 
In Manchuria, where the land redistribution program was, for the first time, implemented in a 
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thorough manner, the PLA was able to recruit as many as 1.6 million members between June, 
1946 and June, 1947 (Bianco, L. 1971: 189). This reflects on the overarching impact of the 
socio-economic programs in keeping the Chinese peasantry attached to the CCP even during 
the period of civil war from 1946 to 1949.         
Johnson also argued that communist propaganda aroused the nationalist spirit among the 
Chinese peasantry in the wake of Japanese invasion in 1937 (Johnson, C. A. 1962: 4). Johnson 
himself suggested that the communists had started their anti-Japanese nationalist propaganda 
since Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 with very little success to their credit (ibid., p. 4). 
But why had the same tactic become so effective in 1937? According to Johnson, the Japanese 
invasion in 1937 was massive compared to the one in 1931, and, moreover, the communists 
underplayed their agenda of class struggle and land redistribution in their 1937 propaganda 
(ibid., p. 4). Johnson was probably right, but there were more to it. History suggests that the 
KMT also ran similar forms of propaganda upholding ‘national salvation’ in 1937 but kept 
quiet in 1931. If we accept the fact that the concerted propaganda, run simultaneously by both 
the CCP and the KMT, created a huge impact in China, then why would the peasants, aroused 
by nationalism, choose the communists as their ally? If it were only nationalism that played the 
key role, the nationalist government should have been a more deserving candidate for popular 
support (Selden, M. 1995: 19). At the time of the Japanese invasion in 1937, the KMT was in 
power controlling the largest expanse of the country and was also internationally recognized as 
the legitimate government of China. Contrarily, the communists were hitherto an insignificant 
force ‘barely surviving’ in parts of rural China. According to Mark Selden, the KMT was ‘well 
positioned’ to take advantage of the war-induced nationalism (ibid., p. 19). It too tried to 
mobilize rural resistance but failed measurably.   
In fact, the failure of the KMT was another major contributor to ‘the Communist triumph’ 
(Bianco, L. 1971: 180 & 199). The superior military might of the KMT lost to an inferior force 
of the CCP due to incompetent leadership, endemic corruption, factionalism, weak morale etc. 
(ibid., pp. 180-181). Moreover, Chiang Kai Shek’s war strategy of primarily protecting the 
cities at the expense of the critical mass and overextending beyond the regime’s capacity made 
the situation worse. On the other hand, the Red Army or the PLA was free from all the above 
weaknesses (ibid., p. 184). It had honest and competent generals at the top to command and 
strategize, and spirited and committed fighters to fight as one team in the battlefield (ibid., p. 
184). This probably made the big difference in the overall situation. The KMT also failed to 
manage the economy well. Since the real incomes of government officials and soldiers went 
down due to hyperinflation, most of them got involved in corrupt practices (ibid., p. 195). This 
had led to further worsening of the governance situation undermining the legitimacy of the 
KMT regime. The failure to come to terms with the communists to bring an end to the war also 
agitated and alienated the intellectuals and students many of whom were once nationalist 
sympathizers. As a result, the party’s support bases were shrinking gradually. However, it is 
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very difficult to ignore the large account of failures of the KMT that had contributed, in a big 
way, to the CCP’s success story.                                    
Johnson further argued that the Japanese mop-up operations and frequent reprisals also pushed 
the Chinese peasants towards the communists after 1937. According to him, peasants willing to 
join the resistance against the Japanese invaders chose the CCP due to its reputation as ‘the 
most competent organizer of resistance’ (Johnson, C. A. 1962: 5). Here also came the 
consideration of competence, not nationalism. The spirit of nationalism might have played a 
major role for the peasants in making their decision to join the war of resistance. But at the 
stage of deciding on whether to join the CCP or the KMT, the peasants must have acted 
rationally. They rightly chose the CCP on the basis of its competence as had been suggested by 
Johnson himself. There were definitely some valid reasons that prompted the notion that the 
communists were the most competent ones. Mao Zedong was prudent enough to assess the 
uniqueness of the class situation in China. It was not the factory owners in the urban areas, but 
the ‘feudal landowners’ in rural China who were the reason for the suffering of the masses 
(Tomba, L, 2010: 156). Therefore, he persistently pursued the strategy of focusing on the 
impoverished peasantry for mass mobilization. He also took the timely decisions of temporarily 
underplaying the agenda of land redistribution and emphasizing on national salvation during 
the period of the Japanese invasion from 1937-1945. Without a leader like Mao, the course of 
the Chinese revolution would have most likely been different (Esherick, J. W. 1995: 54). 
Moreover, the entire leadership of the CCP under Mao Zedong lived on the ground throughout 
the period of the communist revolution. This helped them not only to better understand the 
needs of the common people but also to experiment with various models of reforms in order to 
address those needs. Important lessons were learnt from these experimentations on a trial and 
error basis. Positive lessons were reapplied, while negative ones were divested. This on-the-
ground presence also allowed the Chinese people to watch the day-to-day affairs of the 
communist leadership from a closer distance and thereby measure the honesty, sincerity, and 
capability of the latter. The pro-people attitude of the communists from top to bottom also drew 
the attention of the common people. Lucien Bianco may be quoted here, ‘to millions of 
peasants, soldiers, and civilians alike, the Red Army brought the immediate promise of a new 
existence, of liberation from all the evils of the old society’ (Bianco, L. 1971: 190). The 
resultant overall positive impression about the communists together with other relevant factors 
inspired the Chinese peasantry to choose a side and ultimately unite under the banner of the 
CCP. The spirit of nationalism seemed to be one of the factors here that was, of course, valid up 
to Japan’s surrender in 1945. 
Nationalism might have played a role in forging an alliance between the CCP and the Chinese 
peasantry during the period of the Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945, but how far it had 
played the role to sustain and prolong the alliance through the period of civil war from 1946 to 
1949 remains questionable. The KMT, being a native regime, was not viewed by the Chinese 
masses as an invader (Esherick, J. W. 1995: 68). Immediately after Japan’s surrender in 1945, 
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the ‘heightened nationalism’ in China was helping the KMT as well (Bianco, L. 1971: 167). 
This essay does not believe that nationalism, though important, was the key driver of the CCP – 
peasantry alliance during the period of civil war. Instead, the CCP succeeded in keeping the 
alliance with the peasantry alive by successfully projecting the KMT as a bunch of ‘domestic 
enemies’ (ibid., p. 167). Perhaps, the tainted credentials of the KMT officials on board provided 
the necessary justification for it. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that the CCP was unable to gain support from the peasants 
outside the territories under its control or the immediate neighborhoods (Bianco, L. 1975: 328). 
This indicates that the main factor(s) / issue(s) for which peasants supported the party had local 
level implications only. If it were an issue like nationalism, then the impact of it could have 
transcended beyond localities. The appeal of nationalism is presumably difficult to contain 
within a certain locality. This is consistent with the view of the scholars that the Chinese 
peasants were attracted to the CCP based on their real life experience with the party policies 
and programs, its leadership and cadres, and the Red Army / PLA (Gillin, D. G. 1964: 281). In 
this connection, it may also be noted that the people in Japanese occupied areas were initially 
indifferent to either of the parties and almost everywhere enthusiastically welcomed the KMT 
forces as ‘liberators’ upon Japan’s surrender in 1945. Unfortunately, the enthusiasts were 
‘cooled off’ after being mistreated by their so-called ‘liberators’ (Franke, W. 1970: 185). In fact, 
the real life experience helped the Chinese masses to choose a side, since both parties were 
claiming to represent the spirit of nationalism.     
5. CONCLUSION:  
From the above analyses, it is evident that many factors, including peasant nationalism, 
contributed to the CCP’s rise to power in 1949. Chalmers A. Johnson argued that the CCP, by 
following an almost similar type of strategy, failed to garner popular support up to 1936 but, in 
contrast, gained overwhelming response during the period of the Japanese invasion from 1937 
to 1945 (Johnson, C. A. 1962: 2). According to him, the Japanese invasion aroused the spirit of 
nationalism among the peasantry which was key to the success of the CCP. This essay holds the 
view that nationalism, induced by the Japanese invasion, was one of the factors that brought 
peasants closer to the CCP, but was neither the only one nor the key. There were other 
important factors too that directly or indirectly contributed to the CCP’s rise to power in 1949. 
In fact, both the CCP and the KMT were riding on the surge of nationalism in China. The 
Chinese peasantry chose a side on the basis of their real life experience involving many other 
factors. 
This essay recognizes the significance of at least three important factors other than peasant 
nationalism. Firstly, the peasant-friendly socio-economic policies and programs had played a 
major role in binding the peasants with the CCP in a long term relationship. Effects of this 
factor transcended beyond the periods of pre and post Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945, 
and continued to serve up to the final victory in 1949. Secondly, none can ignore the important 
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role of the KMT’s failure in making the communists succeed. The utter failure of the KMT 
helped the communists to emerge in the eyes of the people as the best alternative to lead the 
country. Thirdly, the role of Mao Zedong and his committed cadres in appropriately assessing 
the situation, strategizing accordingly, and finally acting on the ground as a team can be cited 
as one of the pillars of success for the CCP. 
This essay also argues that the appeal of nationalism was quite strong in China up to Japan’s 
surrender in 1945 but lost its vigor during the period of civil war. Post 1945, other socio-
political factors came to the ‘fore’ pushing nationalism to the backseat, and led the CCP to 
power in 1949.         
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